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IBISMARCK'S AT^I^ttd^ TOWARD THR HPTRAKCI 0^ PAVAPI* IHTO THE
NO^TH OERKAN COHTTORRATIOH,
Bavaria's future, as viewed from the field of TTCniggratz,
,
might
well cause statearen and people serious concern. Austria, the de-
feated ally, had no power to intercede for the South German States.
Victorious Prussia was eage*~ for further conquest and pushed the
army up to Vienna. Bavaria, alcne, was too weak to offer any effect-
ive resistance to the powerful neighbor on the north, who right de-
mand either territory or money, or both, as compensation for losses.
Although the question of the leadership of the German people
was now definitely settled, "Prussia dared not nake too rigorous de-
mands of Bavaria. Surrounded as she was by enerries she was obliged
to move circumspectly, if more powerful armies were not to intervene,
'Frherev3r there was a chance, therefore, to turn an enerry into a
friend without sacrificing any North German interests it was good
policy to do so. Pesidas, to be lenient with Bavaria now in this
time of need night enable Prussia to form connections that would
eventually lead to the union of Germany, a long sought consummation.
"Tien these facts concerning the position of the two countries
are taken into consideration it does not seem so strange that the
erstwhile bitter enerries should now form a treats of offense and
defense. A little more than a month after KOniggratz the Bavarian
Chamber of Deputies while discussing the indemnity to be paid to
Prussia expressed the wish "that his Majesty the King would be
graciously pleased to use his influence in such a direction that,
by means of a closer union with Prussia, the path be entered upon
which, at the present time, is the only one that can lead tc the

wi3hed-for goal of a united Germany, co-operating with a freely
elected parliament constituted with the powers demanded for the
effectual guarding of national interests and the repulse of possi-
ble attacks from abroad." 1
Four days later, August 22, the bavarian ministers and Bismarck
signed the treaty of offense and defense. This treaty guaranteed
to the contracting parties the integrity of their territory and
obligated each to place its full army strength at the disposal of
the other in case of war. In such case the Bavarian forces were
to be under the command of the king of Prussia? This treaty was to
be ratified at the same time as the treaty of peace, but was to be
kept secret for the time being. In fact it was not disclosed until
the next spring.
The following day, August ^3, the treaty <bf peace, known as the
treaty of "Prague, was signed. In the fourth article of this treaty
the TSmperor of Austria agrees "to recognize the closer "Federal un-
ion which his Majesty, the. king of Prussia, will establish north
of the line of the Main, and further declares himself agreed to
the combination of the states south of this line in a union whose
international relations to the North Herman Confederation are to be
determined by nearer negotiations between the two, and which shall
have an independent national existence." 3 Following the conclusion
of this treaty King Ludwig, in order to show that he was filled
with the kindliest feelings for Prussia, wrote a personal letter
to "King William offering him the possession in common with him-
self of their ancestral castle at Nuremberg. He expressed the hope
I.Hohenlohe fMemo ire ,1 ,160.
2.Schulthess ,Oeschichtskalendar , IP66 ,449.
3. • • 8?8,

3that the banners of "both floating from its tower3 might "be recog-
nized aa a symbol that Prussia and Bavaria are both watching in
harmony over Germany's future welfare, which "Providence has now by
the hand of your ^oyal Majesty guided into new paths." 4
^he state of feeling of the Bavarians can be pretty well illus-
trated by their reception of the treaty, The prime minister, Pford-
ten expressed himself as satisfied with the situation. He was
pleased that Prussia had refrained from demanding a part of upper
Bavaria, but had been content with a money indemnity of thirty mil-
lion florins. He strongly favored an alliance with Prussia, but not
a federation. Forty two members, more than one-third, of the Second
Chamber "denounced the dismemberment of Germany into North and South
and rejected all thoughts of a Southern Confederation, demanding
rather a united fatherland with a common parliament and a common
head." 5 They a3ked that Bavaria seek admission into the North German
Confederation as soon as possible, but that in the meantime a close
alliance be established with Prussia, the Tariff Parliament be con-
tinued and developed, and that if German territory should be threat-
ened, the army be put under the control of the king of Prussia. The
majority were more conservative, ^hey feared that Bavaria's consti-
tutional freedom might be jeopardized by joining the Confederation
before its constitution was agreed upon. The First Chamber, as was
natural, was anti-Prussian in feeling. The nobility feared the loss
of the independence of Bavaria and the consequent lose of their own
prestige. No difficulty was met with, however, in securing the ap-
proval of the treaty and of the loan necessary to pay the indemnity.
The treaty was approved by many who would bitterly oppose any
4. Svbel .Founding of the German En pi re ,V , 453.
5. " " " " V, 521-522.

4attempt to unite with Prussia. It was as a measure of safety for
Bavaria that they had voted for it. The Ultramontanes complained
because Austria had been expelled from Germany and the Fatherland
had been dismembered. The people of ^Grtemberg raised again the
watchwords of 1 84 9 . "Everywhere were sounded the praises of the Cotv
stitution(of I84P) and the highly prized fundamental rights
therein grantedjyet with equal zeal the federative independence
of each individual German race and state was demanded."^
Provincial characteristics , also , caused bitter feeling between
the sections. The bluster inn; , boastful Prussian was particularly
distasteful to the South German who, in his turn , believed himself
to be of the only pure German stock and his country to have been
the cradle of the German people.
Although this feeling between the sections grew in sore class-
es to almost bitter hatred and uncompromising hostility, cany cir-
cumstances conspired to bring them to a ready acquiescence to the
treaty of peace as well as that of offense and defense. These cir-
cumstances were the growing strength of Prussia as contrasted with
the weakness of Austria, the long-continued agitation for national
unity, and the community of interests with Prussia rather than with
Austria.
Two classes of statesmen dominated the politics of South Ger-
many. One class wanted a federation of all Gerran-3peaking people
which, of course.
,
included the northern and western provinces of Aus-
tria. It was ever: suggested just before the war of 1866 that the
old German Krrpire be revived under the leadership of the House of
6 . Sybel , Pounding of the German Empire, VI, 7.
V. " M " VI, P.

Hapsburg. p That this was utterly out of* the question was settled
at .KPniggratz. Tne reactionary policy of Austria had turned the oygS
of all levers of freedom and of German unity in another direction.
Her weakness was further accentuated by the presence of heterogene-
ous , non-German elements in her population with their accompanying
discordant interests^ideals. On the other hand Prussia had been
growing stronger daily, and was now giving evidence of ability to\
with Trance as well as with Austria.
Another class wished to exclude Austria from the federation
and to rely wholly upon Prussia. Bonds of common interest served
to unite,mere firmly than they knew ,SouthGermany toPrussia. There
was a common language , literature , and history , cogent factors for un-
ion in times of crisis. More powerful than any of these were the
trade relations between the two sections. Since IPJ8 there had ex-
isted between the South German states and Prussia a trade agreerrent
known a3 the Customs TTnion,or Zollverein. Among all the cor. fusion
of political upheaval the Zollverein had become more desireahle,
and more and more firmly fixed in the life of the people. Under it
the trade of Germany ,both domestic and foreign, had grown rapidly,
and communication and intercourse had developed a bond that the
severest stress of political difference had failed to loosen. It
was especially necessary that South Germany retain the market of-
fered by the thirty millions of Noth Germans. If Prussia had de-
sired to exclude the Southern States from those advantages there
would have been a great outcry and a powerful incentive tc aeek a
perrancnt union. •
This tendency toward union was net a thing of short life.Since
the dismemberment of the Empire by Napoleon there had been frequent
outbursts of naticnal feeling. These outbursts had culrrinated in
%Mohz,rtlche,,YYlfrtto\rs
l
Z, ill.
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the revolutionary attempts of 1848-9. At this time ,when the out-
look was so propitious, visionary theorists let the favorable mo-
ment pass in "idiotic , futile prattle." Plan after plan was proposed
as a solution of the problem only to be rejected by the control-
ling powers, or to be cast aside as impractJJ&le. In June, 1848, a
"Provisory Central Executive for all general affairs of the Ger-
man nation" was constituted "until such time as a Paramount Exe-
cutive should be definitely established." *^ Hohenlohe had been
sent to Rome , Athens , and Florence as a minister representing the
German nation. The German residents of these cities were delighted
at this evidence of the movement toward unification in the father-
land. 1 !
Another plan much favored by Bavarian statesmen was the "Triad
V
This was to be a federation of the middle German states under the
leadership of Bavaria. By a combination with Prussia and Austria
the German Confederation would be formed. Both Austria and Prussia
opposed this course, and the kings of Saxony, WQrtemberg,and HanoveK
refused to yield supremacy to the king of Bavaria. Opposition de-
veloped within Bavaria on the part of the Democratic party which
asked either the hegemony of Prussia or the establishment of a re-
10 . Hohenlohe Memoirs , I ,4K
.
11. " " 1,49.
Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingfuerst was a strong
advocate of national union. "During the revolution of 1848- c
he was sent as a representative of the National party to Rome
and Athens. Early in 186? he became Minister of Foreign Affair
and Prime Minister of the Bavarian cabinet. Throughout his
administration he tried plan after plan hoping to bring about
unity. He gave way to Bray in 1870, but was a powerful factor
in securing the union of that year. In 1894 he followed Qount
Capri vi as Imperial Chancellor which office he retained until
I90< .
ml
mm
public. IB
Three possibilities remained tc the Bavarian government after
IRP6. It might form a confederation with the remaining states of
South Germany as was suggested in the treaty of Prague; no senti-
ment favoring such a solution could be found in any of the states.
Or Bavaria might try to 3tand alone, in which case there would be
constant danger of encroachment by the strong neighboring powers.
The only way out of the difficulty seei ed to lie in a union with
a strong power whose interests were similar. Such a power was
"Prussia.
Although there had been much dissatisfaction with the aggres-
sions of Prussia under Bismarck , there had been some reluctance to
join Austria in the war of {866 « The Bavarians had asked ther selves
what quarrel they had with Prussia and why they should go to war
for Augustenberg. 13
Now that Bismarck's policy had been so successful in regard to
Austria, the South Germans gravely considered what his attitude
would be towards them. Prom his own statements it is known that
Bisn arck , although a definite plan was lacking,had in mind a gener-
al outline of what he desired to accomplish with respect to South
Germany. Pirst, North Germany rrus't. assirilate the cor nered prov-
inces and make the N^rth German Confederation a strong power.Secor.fi,
the South German states must be made capable of defense that they
might not be tempting prizes to foreign powers and thus embroil
Prussia. Lastly, he must use even,'' means to conciliate foreign pow-
ers in order that they might permit t 1 e peaceful incorporation of
the conquered provinces in the Confederation that he had planned "P'
IP.Hohenlohe ,Femoirs , I , 156
.
IS, » 1,151,
14. Sybel .Pounding of the German Empire ,V,3IP>.

°There is no doubt that Bismarck was unwilling to have Bavaria
join the Confederation immediately. 15 ^he heterogeneous elements
of the South German population would, in the present state of af-
fairs, be only a hindrance to the consolidation of the states north
of the Fain. The hostility of Hanover and of Saxony must be over-
come first, and the Constitution of the North German Confederation
must be formed and ratified before there could be any question of
further territorial addition with its added burdens. It would be
much easier to fortify South Germany and to drill and e^uip its
army without exciting the hostility of France than if the fortrjsaes
and arry »vere a part of North GSpmany. At the sare time he did not
war f South Germany to lean on any foreign power. 16 ^3 he said to
Suckcw, chief of staff o^ Wfirtemberg, "for the calculating politi-
cian what is necessary takes precedence of that which is desirable
.
" His noticn was that if the South German representatives sat
with those from the North in the Customs Parliament for a few
years, that the former would lose their antagonism and develop a
conciliatory spirit, and that they would discover that he had no
desire to compel them to enter the Confederation,-*^
Miquel stated Bismarck's position well when he said in the
Reichstag in March , I B6? , that "The line of the Main, we adrrit is
but a stopping place at which to take on coal and water, to take
breath before going farther, "I R but during the halt Bismarck
hoped for many changes. He restrained King William's desire to
take Upper Franconia from Bavaria for he knew that such a humili-
ation as the loss of territory would always be a source of irrtta-
I5.Hohenlohe .Memoirs , T , X87 , 1 B4
.
T6. " "I, I*?.
If .Sybel , Founding of the German *2mpire ,VI ,456
.
18. VI, 71.
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9tion and would prevent any possibility of a peaceable unicn for a
long time. 13 That he hoped to be able to bring about this union
at some tine is shown by the draft of an agreement with "Benedetti
in July , IP6f , in which the Erperor Napoleon is to bind hirrself not
to oppose a union of the North German Confederation with the
South German States and the establishment of i cormcn parliarent.
During the years between 1866 and 1870 the sentirrent for union
kept increasing. The Customs Union played no small part in draw-
inn- the sections together, net only in the matter cf creating a cor -
munity of interests but in furnishing a basis for discussion and
an opportunity for intercourse: starting points fron which to
reach out toward the much desired unity. "Bavaria advanced through
its new minister .Hohenlohe , a plan by which many important matters
including customs and commerce , indirect taxes for "Federal purposes,
consular affairs, the banking system , coinage , and weights and meas-
ures should be in charge of a legislative body representing all
Germany. The fault with the plan was that the legislature of every
state must approve each measure. 91 This inclusion of the old lib-
eruia vejbo by so ardent an advocate of union as Hohenlohe seems
strange. It was a vestige of the spirit that had prevented union
for 30 long. The South German States did not want to yield any
rights to prussia or to any other state. It was particularism ver-
sus national ism, and the danger of a great crisis was necessary to
overcome their particularistic tendencies.
Although Hohenlohe' s plan was rejected by "Bismarck , the Customs
TTnion continued as a reminder of the dependence of each section
upon the ether.
As another step in the direction of union, South Hesse asked to
19. gybe 1, "Pounding of the German Empire ,V,4.r)l
o°t* iBismarck ,881 , 1Sybe 1 , sup
.
c i t . VI , P.6 7- 8 ; Hohenlohe . T , t
itot *r
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he admitted into the North German Confederation , since the part of
He3se north of the Main already belonged to it. "Bismarck replied
that before he gave an answer he must confer with Austria and in-
quire of Bavaria if it would injure her interests. What show3 his
permanent policy more than all is his declaration that Heese rust
take the first 3tep. '''his racverrent on the part of Hesse led to a
spirited discussion in the Reichstag. Democrats, HI tramontane 3
,
and a few Particularists offered resolutions which permitted any
former member of the German Confederation to join the North Ger-
man Confederation by accepting its constitution ,without requiring
a special treaty. The National Liberals, on the other hand , desired
to keep in the hands of Prussia the power to admit or reject any
offer of union.' °
The Grand T>uke of "Baden in his speech from the throne of Sep-
tember 5,I8A7,3aid, "It is my firm resolution to do everything
within my power to realize this union; and I, as well as ry faith-
ful people, am prepared to make those sacrifices which are unavoid-
ably associated with such a step'.' ^ Bavaria must have been great-
ly influenced by these movements in neighboring states.
The "Bavarian statesmen were very reluctant to give up any of
the state's independence by entering the Confederation , but the
very fact that ^rince Hohenlohe, a known friend of Prussia and an
advocate of the Prussian alliance, could be made prime minister
less than six months after Kflniggratz shows that the feeling for
unity and the desire to ally ther selves with Prussia must have
been strong. Bavaria did not feel able to bear the responsibility
r,
°.Sybel founding of the German TSmpire
, VI , 188-1*9
.
88, » « « > m,PA-\
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incurred by isolation, and for that reason we find these falter-
ing advances. The history of Belgium and of Luxembourg showed the
danger of continued isolation. Yet Bavaria was unwilling to take
the final step which would lead to union. The Bavarian government
fondly hoped that the way might be prepared for a constitutional
league with the other states of Germany in which the independence
and sovereign rights of the state would be preserved.' 4
Hohenlohe warned King Ludwig that the continuance of the pre-
vailing state of affairs threatened the kingdom with a double dan-
ger:
"(I). Any European corplication , however favorably it right re-
sult for one or the other of the Great Powers, might prove the
greatest danger to the existence and independence of Bavaria,
should Germany be involved in it.
f£).The aspirations of the Gerran people to realise their
national ideal, even against the will of their Governments ,n ight
lead to internal struggles which would threaten the dynasty.
It must therefore be the ta3k of the Government:
(1) . To conclude alliances, by which the danger of European
cor plications would be averted.
(2) . To strive for the formulation of a national union of* Ger-
many which would satisfy the legi f imate demands of the nation
without infringing on the sovereign rights of your Majesty or the
integrity of Bavaria."
In his efforts to attain the desired goal Hohenlohe proposed
many measures which the other South Gerran States refused +o ac-
cept, but the general direction of the movement was toward union,
and the total effect was to bring it nearer. As an example of the
°A. Hohenlohe .MsBCira tI,J86«
85, " l»20I,
1 1 Ln
many different plana promulgated, he sent Tau.ffkirchen to Vienna
and to "Berlin with instructions to try to remove all obstacles
which prevented a union^Prussia and Austria, to arrange an alliance
between these two powers with regard to the Luxembourg ^uss t i on
,
to enter into the same on the part of Bavaria, and to secure favor-
able conditions for opening negotiations with Prussia concerning
the position of the South German States in relation to the North
German Confederate on* 86
Although "Bismarck favored Tauf fkirchen ' s proposal, Austria re-
fused to accept it.
Hohenlohe in connection with Wurtemberg 1 s ministers drew up an-
other scheme of federation known as the "Ministerial Declaration:'
The proposed federation was to consist of Bavaria, ^rttrtemberg,
Baden, South Hesse, and the Notth (reman Confederation. There is
nothing of importance in the declaration itsel* aside from the
facts that Hohenlohe was trying to find sore plan acceptable to all
parties and that ,Trtirtemberg was working with him. p/? Baden disap-
proved of the plan offered aa aid Bismarck, The latter's answer to
the proposal contained some significant fttinfw indicative of his
policy in regard to the matter under consideration. He said that
"Prussia desired a further confederation with the South German States
but "for this confederation there must be found a form of Simple
agreement upon ordinary business, not merely upon such as was to be
foreseen far ahead." 88 That is, Bismarck thought that the formation
of this confederation should be the work of practical men, not of
theoretical dreamers.
8*5 .Hohenlohe ,Meir oirs ,1 ,81!*
P. ft. " 1,880.

12.
King William in hi3 speech -from the throne in February , 1^67
,
laid down a "basis of agreement to which all could subscribe and
which disarrred all fear of aggression by Prussia. He said that the
question of the confederation had been left open by the treaty of
peace of the previous year, and that as soon as the North German
Constitution was in a position such that treaties rright be concluded
the hand of "Prussia would be held out frankly and willing to South
Germany. He believed that the basis for +he agreement between the
two sections should be the maintenance of the Zcl lverjin , the com-
mon administration of domestic affairs, and the measures necessary
for securing the integrity of German territory.??
Another factor in the movement toward union,3eccnd in impor-
tance only to the Customs Parliament ,wa3 the series of military
conventions between "Prussia and the South German States. Prince
Hohenlohe had called the three other states to a conference at
Stuttgart early in February , I R6 7. An agreement was readily reached
in regard to the army footing in time of war and in time of peace,
the length of service, the size of the respective divisions , and the
proportional strength of the three arms of the service. As far as
possible uniform weapons were to be used. All of these things Prus-
sia had long tried in vain to secure. If this plan should meet the
favor of the different states, it would mean that "Bavaria as the
most powerful ,would assume the leadership and in time of war would
ally the joint army with that of "Prussia,main taining independer.ee
in its control. ?
Any hope3 that Bavaria had based upon this conference at Stutt-
gart were doomed to disappointment, The smaller South German States
8P . Hohen 1one ,Memo irs , 1 £og ( no t e).
30. Sybel, Founding of the German Empire , VI , 858
.
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preferred a military combination with Prussia rather than with Bav-
aria. Almost immediately after the close of the conference "Baden
adopted the Prussian needle-gun. This adoption compelled the intro-
duction of the Prussian drill system and the use of Prussian army
officers as instructors. "Sarly in April He3se-Darmstadt united with
Prussia in a military convention by which the entire Hessian Pi vi-
sion became a part of the Prussian army.31 The greatest surprise,
however, cane when ^flrtemburg adopted the "Prussian weapon and drill
regulations. Here theking,the ministry, and a majority of the Cham-
bers were opposed to Prussia, but because of the report han led tt the
king by Suckow,then a young major of the General Staff, upon the
condition of the army, they were willing to grant his re^uedt that
the Prussian system should be used. 32 In this way Bavaria was left
in complete isolation.
The opposition in Prussia was yet very strong and the friends
of union seemed little nearer their goal than after KCAiggratz.
The Prussian king and his associates feared the loss of Prussian
domination and the growth of democracy. To them the individuality
of "Prussia was more important than the union of Germany. The South,
on the other hand,wa3 very sensitive to every move of Bismarck and
the National Liberals. Anything that could be construed as ar. at-
tempt to coerce them, or to place restrictions upon them, aroused a
storm of protest and a flood of condemnatory pamphlets. The South
was further divided into many conflicting parties. The ^tramontanes
favored Austria, the Republicans were opposed to any monarchical
form of government ,and another group longed for the days of the
31. Sybe 1 , Pounding of the German TCmpira ,VI ,256.
58. 1 ** VI,H59-64.

former German Confederation. Ml three were opposed to a union
with North Germany.
This opposition was a-rter all merely the superficial efferves-
cence of party strife common to all countries that are passing
through a 3tage of transition. Although it was powerful enough to
prevent the union of North and South Germany in time of peace, it
needed but the blare of trumpets and the roll of drum to disperse
it in lime of crisis.
The real feeling of the German people was displayed when "Prus-
sia seemed on the point of going to war with France over Luxem-
bourg in 1867. it was not yet a 2^ear since the Prussians had de-
feated the Bavarian army and humiliated its government
,
yet feeling
ran high in all sections of Germany. Resolutions supporting Prussia
in its stand were drawn up in popular assemblies or adopted by
Chambers patriotically inclined. It was repeated time and again
that the whole German race would move to resist the encroachments
of France. 33 King Ludwig declared that he considered the situation
as coming under the clause of the treaty of offense and defense
which stated that the contracting parties would go to the aid of
sach other when attacked or threatened by an enemy. This mjant that
the Bavarian army would support that of Prussia, shouli Prussia and
Prance come to blows.
A similar demonstration took place when the Ems dispatch be-
came known throughout Germany. Sybel says M now a like flood of
national enthusiasm swept in mighty waves over South Germany also;
before a nusket shot had been fired Gramont's audacious proceeding
had brought about that which Napoleon had used all his ingenuity
to prevent, the unification of the German nation, the extension of
33 .Sybel founding of the German Empire ,VI , 145.
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the German Confederation to the Alpa. In Baden the people and the
government apoke a3 a aingle voicejin ^firtemberg and Bavaria the
anti-Pruaaian Depocrata and HItramontane a auddenly found then-
aelvea to be in an alarir;ing minority; through every province rang
the enthuaiaatic call^To arrai Bray told the Trench niniater
that France would find all Germany in oppoaition ahould a war ariae^
The Crown Prince of Pruaaia made a tour of the Southern Statea
in the latter part of July, 1870, to arouae the martial apirit of the
people. TT1tramontane and Democratic newapapera that violently
oppoaed the war were aeiaed.37 A national demonatration was called
in Munich by King Ludwig. Another in Nuremberg made a declaration
that on account of the war with Prai ce they would bind themaelve3
aolidly on the aide of the reat of the Herman people, that aince
the Bavarian government had already called out the full military
atrength of the country to defend the common Fatherland , they ex-
pected their repreaentativea to carry on the war aa energetically
aa poaaible, and they expected every poaaibla aacrifice frcrr their
citizena in order that "the unchangeableneaa and invulnerability of
the German land" might be maintained. 38
The explanation for thia reveraal of 8entiment ia well given by
Sepp. He waa a repreaentative in the Bavarian Second Chamber who
had conaiatently oppoaed war and aided the party that favored
armed neutrality. "Then he heard of the French declaration of war
he joined the war party. Rieing to explain hi8 vote he aaid that
the day before he had written out a apeech in favcr of armed neu-
34. Sybel,Founding of the German TSmpire ,VII ,401
.
35. " VII, 401.
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trality. "But yesterday and today are separated by a decade of
ordinary events; since then the "French declaration of war ha3 been
received; the king of Prussia in his speech from the throne takes
our support for granted; who today i3 inclined to ask for the cause
of the war? Yesterday the woes of 1866 were still remembered; to-
day wrath against France la preeminently in the heart of everv
Herman. In the battle of Leipzig we Bavarians took no part; in the
new battle of the nations we want to do our share."
The "Bavarian government responded quickly to the martial spir-
it of the people. The full strength of the army was put unde>- the
command of the king o^ "Prussia, the Cumbers voted the necessary
supplies, and the soldiers were hurried to the frontiers.
The future of German unity would be greatly influenced by the
conduct of these soldiers. If they proved to be incompetent, their
government would be humiliated; but if they proved valorous, the
Bavarian people would demand mere rights before they would give up
their independence.
8§l Sybel , Founding of the German Empire, VI I ,446.
King Ludwig declared that the casus foederis was given. Some
of the Chambers proposed arred neutrality but were scon voted down
-Kcbell-King Ludwig II and Prince Biaeiarck,3,5,I9,
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Hp to the outbreak of the "Franc o-"Pru33ian war ^iamarck ,aa we
have aeen,did little in a direct way to haaten the union of South
Germany with the North German Confederation. Having aecured the
treaty of offenae and defense with Bavaria in XS66 he permitted e-
vents to take their natural course, no doubt feeling sure that a
succeaaful amalgamation of the different atate3 that were included
in the North German Confederation and the eetabliahr ent of a atrong
government there combined with the national feeling prevailing
throughcnt Germany would do more to bring about unity than coercion
or interference on his part. However , aince the war with France had
begun, and waa now being aucceaafully concluded, eventa moved rap-
idly toward a united Germany. "Tiat part Biamarck played in bring-
ing about this union it ia the purpose of the following paged to
trace.
"inhere are diverse opiniona aa to the part Bismarck had in the
final union all the German atatea. Some would have it that he
had foreseen all the occurrences o^ 1^70 and had deftly laid hia
plans which he forced to a succeaaful concluaion in November. 0th-
era think that without attempting beforehand to bring about the de-
deaired condition of affaira he carefully watched every event of
that year and rade uae of it to further hia wiah for ur.icn. Fo
doubt Bismarck had aa a goal the unification of Germany whenever
the time waa ripe, and no doubt he molded eventa aa far aa he could
to bring thia deaire to paaa, but it ia improbable that he foreaaw
the 8ucceasion of events by which union finally cane. It ia a meas-
ure of statesmanship not to anticipate events but to turn them to
advantage
.
A few of Bismarck's acts and remarks are capable of beinp; con-
strued aa evidence of his having planned the break with France. In

April, 1870, he is quoted as saying that things could not remain as
they were hut that another step was necessary. This further step
he probably considered to be war, for he said he was preparing to
wage **not one war , but four," and that Prussia was able to carry
their out successfully. 40 His close associates believed that he was
more deeply implicated in the Spanish candidature than he acknowl-
edged. 41 The precise object that he had in mind will probably nev-
er be known. Then, too, his paraphrase of the Ems dispatch clearly/
shows that he was more than willing, if not positively anxious, for
war with Prance.
Most of the evidence, however, tends to show that Bisnarck was
willing to wait for the completion of German unity. He undoubtedly
wanted the South German States to join the North German Confedera-
tion, but he was willing to allow time tc work changes in the senti-
rents of the people. He didAwant to give them a chance to 3ay that
they had been forced into the union. It took patience and an un-
common amount of skill to avoid trouble with the progressive ele-
ment in his own party. The Crown "Prince opposed Bismarck in this
waiting program for he wished to force the negotiations through
and to bring about the "Empire in a twinkling without any regard to
the South German leaders. 4?. King William, and his military associ-
ates wished to prevent any loss of Prussian domination. They also
preferred the Reichstag to a federated parliament
. They wished a
permanent treaty with the South, accord in foreign politics, and
"Prussian control of Sbuth German troops. Both the Prussian lords
40. Hohenlohe ,Memoirs ,11 ,6.
41. "Pusch ,Bismarck :Sone Secret Pages froir His History , I , IS.
4?,. Brandenburg, Per Einiritt der Suddeutschen Staaten ir de
Norddeutschen Bund,9-IC.

and the South German princes wished to avoid any strengthening of
democracy either by changing the Constitution to liberal 3entirents
or by allowing a people's representative to present the crown to
William. This was the platform of the Conservative party in the
main. Bismarck did not favor peace at any price as did the king
and the Conservatives, nor did he go as far in the direction of
rapid action as did the Crown "Prince and his party. Yet the king
was a factor that he could not ignore, and Bismarck knew well how
far he could go with hirr. 43
It was probably due to the pacific nature of the king that Bis-
marck could so patiently wait for the fulfilment of German unity.
44
He said that the development of Germany might take thirty years.
"Should Germany attain its national object before the close of the
nineteenth century," he told Suckow, "I should deem it a great
achievement; and should it be consummated within ten or even five
years, it would be extraordinary, an unexpected gift of God." 45 At
another tine he remarked somewhat petulantly in Busoh's presence
that it was a pity that the people of Baden could not wait for Ger-
man unity, that they were approaching their goal, but that it would
require "one year, perhaps, or five, or, indeed, possibly even ten
years. "46 To the repeated offers of Baden to enter the North Ger-
man Confederation Bismarck replied that, although such a combination
was his ultimate air , he did not wi3h to see it brought about until
all the Southern States, wholly free from outside influences,
should eagerly desire it. He would perhaps
43.Brandenburg, aup.cit. ,11.
44. Hohenlohe ,! remoira,1 ,319.
45. Sybel founding of the German Kmpire ,VI ,436.
46.Buach ,aup. cit. ,1,3.
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have welcomed Bavaria into the Confederation, even though alone,
but Baden with its long frontage on France would make the taak <of
defense a serious one. Moreover, to admit Baden alone would prob-
ably cause WfHrter.ber^ and Bavaria to seek the protection of Aus-
tria, and would give France a pretext for war. 47
Bismarck desired a united Oernany, powerful and strong, and he
wished to avoid any movement that would prevent the attainment of
his desires. By pressure he might have been able to bring about the
union more quickly, but it would have been at the expense of the
strength of the nation. He preferred to wait rather than to laek
strength. 48
Bavaria had changed little in its attitude tcward unicn since
the treaty of offense and defense. It still opposed any encroach-
ment upon its independence , vet it knew it could not remain iso-
lated without serious less. Since a union would cor pel the differ-
ent states to surrender some of their sovereignty, the Bavarian
government wished to form a federation in which each state would
retain these rights. Some of this delay must have been due to the
fact that the Bavarian statesmen knew that such a loss was inevi-
table and disliked to accept the blame for it. This was not true
of Hohenlohe, but having disagreed with his colleagues in the n ir-
is try he gave to Bray who favored union less strongly.
47. Sybel .Founding of the firman Empire , VII ,?.?,?,.
4K.8tolze ,Die Orunding des deutschen Beichs im Jahre IP7(*
page 79.
"The Count of Bray-Steinburg, f I807-IW9) was born and educated
in "Berlin. He early entered the diplomatic service of Bavaria. He
was successively Councilor of Legation at St. Petersburg and at
Paris
, ambassador to Creece, Bussia, and Minister of foreign Af-
fairs. In I p 70 upon the resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, Bray be-
came Minister of foreign Affairs and prime Minister of the Bavari-
an Cabinet. Buring his tenure of office the Pranco-Prussian war
was fought and the German Empire was formed.
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It was this halting, uncertain , confused policy that was dcr ina-
ting Bavarian opinion when the Franco-Prussian war began. Just how
the change cane about is difficult to discover, and the contradict-
ory movements of the king and his cabinet cannot be easily explains
It iray be that the Bavarian government halted between its own de-
sires and the desires of the people which were new beginning to
rake themselves felt.
There is no doubt that a great impetus for union set in after
the fall of Sedan, and that a wave of enthusiasm swept over all
Oermany. This is especially true of the Bavarian soldiers. King
Ludwig, as usual, either in advance of popular opinion or far be-
hind it, this time lagged behind his people. While his troops were
yet under the command of Prussia he had a3ked guaranties that no
attempt to lessen Bavarian sovereignty would be made during the
war. In the celebration ever the victory at Sedan he had forbidden
the display of any other flag than the Bavarian and had left Mun-
ich in anger in the midst of the general rejoicing. Prime Minister
Bray had sought as a reward ^or supporting Prussia a revision, fa-
vorable to Bavaria, of the treaty of offense and defense and c r
the Customs Anion treaty. He had specifically asked for Bavaria
tha veto power in concluding Zollverein rates. He even contem-
plated the recall of Bavarian troops now that all danger of French
aggression had passed. 50
Notwithstanding these childish actions of the king and his
minister, a few days after the fall of Sedan the Bavarian govern-
ment had taken the decisive step toward opening negotiations with
49. Brandenburg, sup. cit. ,15.
50. " " If.

with the North German Confederation. SepteDber IG, Bavaria asked
Bismarck to send Delbrttck, presiding officer of the Reichstag, to
Munich in order that they might discuss with him the feasibility
of changing the existing international treaty to a Federated Con-
stitution.^ 1 This ^uick change of sentiment seems to have been due
to the easily aroused public opinion which found storr.y expression
in the press, in the assemblies, and in petitions. Any one familiar
with the revolutionary days of IR4P right well fear for the Bava-
rian dynasty, if it should oppose this universal tendency.
Whether public opinion alone was sufficient tc bring about the
change in the government cannot be determined. Two other events
may have contributed their influence. It seems that Bismarck sent
King John of Saxony a warning that he should not follow the recal-
citrant Bavaria in opposition to union. Secondly, Wurtemberg had
made friendly advances to "Prussia granting an order to King
William.. Of more significance than the decoration of the king with
the order was the fact that Suckow, the earnest advocate of union,
was selected to present it to King William.. Wurtemberg seemed
ready to join the North German Confederation. 52 Undoubtedly the
knowledge of these two facts accelerated, at least, the actions of
the government at Munich.
51. Brandenburg,Briefe und Aktenstucke , I ,Nr.3G.
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Delbrflck was educated in Halle, Bonn, and Berlin. *He*entered thePrussian Bureau of Commerce and in 1859 became director of the De-partment of Commerce and Industry in which position he consolidated
!L iverein ' In IP'67 he hecame president of the Reichstag, inI86R a Prussian Ifinlater of State. He was one of Bismarck's firmest
adherents and on a diplomatic mission through the South Genoa*States and as negotiator at Versailles he stronglv supported Bis-
n?
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Bavaria's request reached the Prussian headquarters at Pheirra,
Septenber IP,, and with all possible speed Pelbrtick started for
Munich, ^urtemberg asked to be permitted to take part in the con-
ference and sent Mittnacht as her representative. Mi ttnacht ,who
favored union with Prussia, had taken the place of Varnbuler, its
bitter opponent. He wanted to learn the views of Bavaria and of
Prussia without making any binding agreement with them. 53
When the conference ret, September £2 , wfirtemberg* s evident de-
sire to enter into negotiations in regard to union with Prussia
contrasted plainly with Pavaria's plan of a looser organization.
Bavarian statesmen were not content tc enter into a union with
North Germany with special rights reserved to then. If it were im-
possible tc found a loose union by the removal of the North Herman
Confederation, then they hoped to secure a wider union beside the
narrower. That is, North Germany and all the states that would be-
come subordinate to her constitution, Baden, South Hesse, and per-
haps everityally Wurten berg, would form the narrow union. Tp this
union "Bavaria would be an ally. The first question to be deter-
mined was whether Prussia would consider a modification of the
constitution; if net, then Bavaria must hold for the wider Federa-
tion, "an organic union with the Confederation but not an entrance
into the same." On this point "Raxaria tried above all things tc
get a declaration from ^elbrflck. ^4
Pelbrtick and Biararck rn the "Prussian side and Mittnacht for
"Wrtenberg care to the sane conclusion: that the only method of
entrance into the existing union was under premise of special
.^.Brandenburg,Br iefe und Ak tenstficke , I ,Nr . 51
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rights in certain points. De lbruck could not consider a remodeling;
of the North German Constitution. Only the wider Federation, or
direct union, was left to Bavaria. It looked as if the conference
would break up without result, The Bavarian ministers tried to make
Prussia assume the role of making demands, but Delbrtick did not
mean to give Bavaria the opportunity to lay the responsibility for
failure in the negotiations upon Prussia. He had gone to Munich
under orders from Bismarck to hear and to discuss Bavaria' 3 desires
and propositions, not to state a definite Prussian policy in re-
gard to union,"
It is probable that T'ittnacht made the proposal that they dis-
cuss the question of a wider federation in order that the views of
the different parties right be learned. In this discussion it was
seen that "Prussia and ^ftrtenberg we^e better prepared to discuss
the; questions proposed than Bavaria. 'Hie bavarian ministers could
not agree among therselves upon what course to pursue, and argued
vehemently in the presence of Mittnacht and Belbrflck and showed,
without rreaning to dc so, the hopeless confusion of their govern-
ment, and their utter lack of a definite plan. 56
Among the subjects proposed by "Bavaria for consideration, the
following were the most inportant:
1. Legislation concerning the relations between the rrcther
country and colonies, cit izenship , and industry should be re-
served to the individual states.
2. The right of appointrent of their own consuls to foreign
countries and the reception of foreign consuls in Bavarian ter-
ritory should be retained.
3. Bavaria asked for the independence oT its railways; ex-
cept that the establishment of rules fcr the construction of the
55 . "Brandenburg
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more iirportarit military reads arid the proper construction of
such roads as were necessary for the protection of common ter-
ritory 3hould he permitted to the Confederation.
4. In the sam.e way the post and telegraph systems were to
be independent.
5. "Bavaria raised the question of establishing reciprocal
legal aid in cririnal matters.
6. Bavaria wished to allow common legislation by the Con-
federation only in matters concerning commercial law.
7. "Bavaria asked eight votes in the Eundesrat instead of
the six: held in the Zoll "Parliament.
8 . Bavaria was to have permanent seats in the commitee on
land forces and forts, on customs and imposts, on industry and
commerce
.
9. ^avaria a3ked a closer definition of the duty and com-
petence of the committees of the "Rundesrat.
IC. The presiding officer of the North Herman Confederation
should not welcome foreign ministers, but this should be done
by the representatives of the North Herman Confederation com-
bined with those of South Germany.
II. The consent of the "Rundesrat must be secured for every
declaration of war (except in case of aggression upon territory
of the Confederation) and it 3hould be the presiding officer's
duty to inform them of previous attempts at negotiation.
IP,, It should be a part of the Constitution that a Bava-
rian representative should always sit in the peace negotiations.
13, The states of the Confederation should retain the
right to conclude treaties, especially those that did not touch
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the interests of the Confederation.
14. In case "Prussia should be prevented "Bavaria should
have the right tc preside in the Bjyidesrat,.
15. Legislation of the Confederation en imposts, on malt
liquors and spirits should not be extended to Bavaria.
16. The navy should belong exclusively to the North German
Confederation and in such case the South Etonian States should
not contribute to its financial support.
17. Bavaria held firmly tc the control of its own arry
under its own generals in time of peace, but subordination tc
the generals of the Confederation was to be granted in time of
war.
18. Bavaria refused to acknowledge the competence of the
Bunde
s
rat and Bund legislation over constitutional differences
between the states.
19. Similar 137, Bavaria could not recognize the interfei
—
ence of the Bundlesrat or of Bund legislation in the denial of
justice,
80 t Lastly, Bavaria wished and absolute veto against any
extension of the power of the Bund and against all changes in
the Constitution which touched her right to vote or her sepa-
rate existence, 57
Kittnacht agreed to many of the propositions of Bavaria, but he
opposed limitation of the competence of the Bund
,
eight votes for
"Havaria in the Bjjn^^rat, permanent positions for Bavaria on the
committees, instead of which he proposed alternation of repre3enta
57. Brandenburg,sup.cit. ,23-85,
Briefe und Aktenstttcke ,1 ,Nr. 47.
Stolze ,sup.cit. ,157-15?.
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tives; he pointed that the international character of the repre-
sentation through the president of the Bund was essential; he said
the power of a single state to veto constitutional changes would
hinder progress, and even urged the extension of Bund legislation
over press and union matters; he asked that committees be Trade up
with four states besides the president. 5 ^
DelbrtJck favored, either positively or tacitly, the railway
proposition, committees, independent treaty rights, and Bavarian
vice-presidency of the Bjjndjjsrat . On many matters he expressed no
opinion. He absolutely refused the eight votes of Bavaria in the
^un£ej3rat , the separation of Bavaria from the Bund's diplomatic
representatives, the limitation of the navy to the North German
States, and the power of veto. He said that legislation concerning
industry and citizenship should be under control of the union, and
that the appointment of foreign consuls 3hould be matters for the
Bund to settle; further that the regulation of the relations of
the post to the public, the establishment of post taxes, and the
conclusion of postal treaties with foreign countries should be
through the Bund. 59
It had not been the intention to vote upon the matters discussed,
nor were any definite conclusions reached; yet all the participants
in the conference felt satisfied with the results. Delbruck 3aid
as he left Kunich, M the (rerman union is assured." He thought that
the disputed points could be settled satisfactorily. Mittnacht said,
"I return to Stuttgart pleased with the course of the discussion
as a suitable foundation and not doubtful of the final success of
5 8 . Brandenburg , sup . c i t . , P. 5 - 2 6 .
59. 8 6-?, 7.
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the work." Count Bray wrote," A 11 in all, one can point to the
course of the Munich discussion as favorable." 60
Among historians not so favorable a view is held. Lorenz says
the conference meant nothing toward furthering union; Von Ruville
thinks a backward step was taken; and Kttntzel declares that Bis-
marck and wflrtemberg dominated the discussions.^ 1
It is difficult to find a basis upon which these men founded
their opinions, The aim of the conference was to secure informa-
tion ( solely. They wished to measure the gap that separated them.
The discussion of the protocol proposed by Bavaria enabled them to
compare views and to determine whether there was any chance for^
agreement, or whether the whole plan of union must be abandoned.
Prussia and Wtlrtemberg were not wholly agreed, yet they both op-
posed some of the weightiest demands of Bavaria. The Bavarian
statesmen had, no doubt, asked more than they expected to get and
were willing to yield some points. That Bismarck considered the
conference valuable is shown by the satisfaction with which Del-
bruck was received upon his return to "Prussian head quarters. 62
While Suckow was in Versailles presenting the order tc "King
William, Biarrarek told him that any messenger from WQrtemberg with
power to open negotiations would be gladly received, and he further
extended a personal invitation to King Karl himself to come to Ver-
sailles. On his return to Stuttgart, however, Suckow found the king
somewhat cooler in his attitude toward the proposition, whether
from the influence of the Bavarian minister or because Suckow
brought no prospect of enlarging the territory of ™urtemberg is not.
AO. Brandenburg,Br iefe und Aktenstucke
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known, At any rate the king would not go to Versailles, but the
ministry decided to send a letter to ^isirarck saying that Mittnacht
and Suckow were ready to go to headquarters to open negotiations
with him. In this manner the Versailles conference was opened. 63
It is difficult to determine to whor belongs the honcr of giving
this new impetus to the negotiations for union. Bismarck after re-
ceiving Delbruck's report of the Munich conference informed Baden
that her offer to join the North Herran Confederation would now be
received with pleasure. Accordingly it was sent out on the 3rd of
October and reached Berlin two days later. 64 The letter of the
Wflrtemberg ministry was sent on the 7th of the same nonth. It is
probable that neither had heard of the action of the other. Nor is
it important that we know which played the leading part. The time
was ripe ^or further negotiations and the offer to open the dis-
cussion would have been made, inevitably, by sore one of the South
Herman States.
In reply to the letter from the Stuttgart ministry Bismarck said
he awaited the arrival of the envoys with the liveliest interest.
He informed ther that Baden, also, would 3end representatives. Mitt-
nacht was so anxious that Bavaria participate in the discussion that
Suckow, with the consent of the king and the ministry, telegraphed
to Bismarck to ask whether Bavaria had been invited. It is clear
that he had not done so, but upon receipt of Suckow 's telegram Bis-
marck telegraphed to Munich asking whether Bavaria would send repre-
sentatives to Versailles or whether the}*- awaited the return of Del-
of
brflck to Munich. When he informed the Stuttgart courtAwhat he had
63. Brandenburg,Briefe and Aktenstucke , I ,Nr. 70.
Der TSiritritt ,32; Stolze ,sup. cit. , 183.
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Idone Mittnacht declared that he preferred to open negotiations at
Versailles rather than to return to Munich. 65
The invitation was a surprise to the Bavarian government and
caught the ministers unprepared. *Vfter vain attempts to get their
king to go to Versailles Bray, ^ranck, and Lutz set out for that
place on the 20th of October. 66 ^heir plans were just as chaotic
as at the Munich conference, They were not at all clear a3 to the
details of the future German Constitution, nor were the different
ministers acquainted with the plans of each other. Hchenlohe ac-
cuses them of being willing tc sacrifice the dynasty in order to
gratify the North German Confederation and to retain their posts
under the new Confederation. Re also says that Ludwig would grant
anything asked of hirrij provided he was left alone. 67
To avoid protracted debates and petty quarrels Biamarck carried
on the discussions with the different states in separate confer-
ences. He probably knew that important concessions must be made
to Bavaria, and he hoped to bind the other states before concluding
with Bavaria, 68
Negotiations were hampered at every step by the vague instruc-
tions given to the Bavarian envoys. It appears evident that they
were told to maintain as far as possible the independence of Bavar-
ia. That was the extent of the instructions they carried withther.
65. Brandenburg,Der Kintritt ,33; Stclze ,sup.cit. ,183.
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Ludwig said when he received Bismarck's invitation to go to
Versailles that he well knew that the journey to headquarters
would be advisable in many ways and would bring many political
advantages that othe^ise could not be obtained. He said he felt
ill and that since his journey depended upon the desired guar-
anties of Bavarian independence, it was not his will to go.
"Kobe 11 ,3up.cit^36.

Each could interpret then in his own way. For that reason when Del-
bruck proposed that they confer with the understanding that certain
rights be reserved to Bavaria Lutz readily assented. "Bray, however,
refused to negotiate on such a basis. He said that according to his
own opinion they were empowered to discuss only the wider union pro
posed by "Bavaria at, Munich. 6- He finally urged that the Confedera-
tion be fonred withou-1 Bavaria and then planned for Bavaria to al-
ly herself with it. ?
"Further complications arose when different instructions were
sent to the envoys at Versailles by the ministry at Munich and by
the king at Hohenschwangau. Besides the general instructions sent
to the ministers, the cabinet secretary, Kisenhart, wrote to Bray,
Novemberl , that important territorial enlargement was necessary.
The king of ^avaria seemed interested in this part of the matter
alone. He hoped for the long desired land bridge between the upper
territories on the right bank of the Rhine and the Palatinate on
the left bank. Baden could be compensated in TClsass. Of course,
since Baden had aided so much in bringing about the union, Bismarck
could not permit such a thing as that. 7 * This question of increase
of Bavarian territory seems never to have been discussed at Ver-
sailles.
Bray's own attempts at negotiation were hopelessly fruitless.
He presented to Delbruck what he called his own private plan. He
withdrew from the September protocol any claim to limit the com-
petence of the Confederation over territorial and judicial matters,
f>9. Brandenburg ,"Der Eintritt ,39-40.
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Bismarck said that instead ofl three improperly qualified
ministers the Bavarian government should have 3ent one repre-
sentative prepared to conclude matters and to speak for the
government.
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but asked in return participation in the nomination and appoint-
ment of Imperial officers. 72 At the same time Pranck was holding
out with Boon, "Prussian minister of war, for the independence of
"Bavaria in military matters in time of peace. So chagrined was
"Bismarck at these unacceptable demands that he began to consider
seriously a union without Bavaria. 173 Upon asking the Wflrtemberg
ambassadors whether they were prepared to close negotiations with-
out Bavaria he received an affirmative answer. 7 4 Lutz on his part
declared that the propositions of Pray did not express the views
of Bavaria. 75
Bray now changed his tactics. He conceded that the question of
the wider union was not now admissable and that, if Bavaria en-
tered the Confederation, it must be with special rights. tried
to get a statement from Bismarck of the conditions under which
"Bavaria might enter the proposed union. 7^ Bismarck was too clever
a diplomat to yield a position so favorable as the one he occupied
He avoiied any written declaration which night be construed as a
demand upon Bavaria, whereupon Bray stated his inability to pro-
ceed without further instructions. ?7
In the meantime negotiations had been progressing with the re-
maining South Herman States, Many wondered why they might not be
brought to a conclusion at this time. Bismarck knew that the union
must comprise the whole of South Hermann to satisfy both the Her-
man people and foreign powers. Therefore he delayed action for a
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"Bray's position was an uncomfortable one at this juncture.
The newspapers throughout Germany were bitter in their denunci-
ation of the stand of Bavaria. Only one Ultramontane paper
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few days that Bray might have tima to revise hia plana. To prevent
the delay attendant upon correspondence he 3trongly advised the
coming of King Ludwig to Versailles. 78
Bray and his colleagues were now in a difficult position.
Should they return to Munich with the report that Wtirtemberg ,Baden
and Hesse were to enter the Confederation leaving Bavaria outside,
there would be a great outcry in the whole German press against
the opposition of the king and his ministers to national devel-
opment. They could satisfy neither the king in his desire for ter-
ritory, nor the Ultramontane majority with a suitable recompense
for independence, nor public opinion. They must endeavor to retain
for Bavaria as much independence as possible. To avoid the stigma
of traitors , either to the national cause or to their own state,
they must be able to say that they chose the lesser of two evils:
either to break off negotiations or to accept the conditions of
Bismarck. 1^ Bray had never seriously thought of returning to Mu-
nich. His letters show that he planned to remain in Versailles
more than a week after he had said he must go horre for instructions.
He evidently was testing Bismarck to see whether he would grant
any more concessions. To crown his unhappiness Bismarck would
make no demands.
The only alternative left to the Bavarian ministers was to re-
open negotiations. This they did on November 8th. The rumor that
treaties were about to be concluded with the renaining states
hastened their decision. 81
78. Brandenburg,Briefe und ^ktenstucke ,11 ,Nr. 124,
79. * Tier TSintritt ,5I-53;Stolze ,213 ,214.
80. Briefe und Aktenstucke , II ,Nr. I24,Stolze ,235
81. ^r Bintritt ,59-61.
upheld the idea of total independence of Bavaria. Stolze thinks
that "Risrarck had not expected to conclude the treaties with
the states 'representatives but that a congress of the princes
would be called with which he could nar£am. gtol2, o 2I7passim

35
Everything pointed to a speedy conclusion of the union when a
new obstacle appeared. Von Oasser, the Bavarian minister at Stutt-
gart, learned of the proceeding at Versailles. He declared that
Bisrrarck was attempting by falsehood to antagonize Bavaria and
Wflrternberg. Through his close relations with the Stuttgart court
he sought to prevent any action by Wflrternberg without Bavaria. The
Stuttgart government was taken by surprise; bothof the men favor-
able to the union were absent, the king was weak and open to the
influence of the opposition, and the lueen was hostile since all
chance to secure the Hohenzollern lands was lost. They feared Bis-
marck's influence over Suckow and Mittnacht. They al3o feared lest
Bavaria should secure more privileges than Wflrternberg. ft2 "Finally
the opposition grew so strong that on November Hth a telegram was
sent to Mittnacht commanding hirr to conclude no treaties without
Bavaria. ^3
Bismarck was so provoked at this new evidence of hostility that
for a moment he considered arousing the public opinion of the
Southern States against the governments. 94 The Wflrternberg envoys
returned to Stuttgart to disentangle the government's policy.
Bavaria was free for the moment to increase the demands upon Bis-
marck
.
Oasser 's move failed to have the effect that he had expected.
It delayed the negotiations, it is true, for a few days, but its
ultimate result was to bring Bavaria to terms more quickly. Bi^ty
Bray and his colleagues knew that it would take too long to await
instructions on each point from Munich, hence they decided to pre-
8B. Brandenburg, Der Eintritt ,f>2-G3.
88. " Briefe und Aktenstucke
,
II ,Nr. I43»Stolse222.
84. " Der Eintritt,66.
It is hinted that Q,ueen Olga of 7/urtemberg, sisterof the
Czar, hopad to secure the Hohenzollern lands in Wflrternberg by
witholding her consent to further negotiation. „
-Stolze-28?

sent to the king and his advisers the treaty a3 an accomplished
fact. The new "basis of negotiations was given to "Bismarck Novem-
ber 12th. Nothing was heard in the last stages of the discussion
about Bavaria's eight votes in the Bundesrat, diplomatic repre-
sentation in the "Bund, and the other points that had been 3uch
stumbling blocks to the progress of the negotiations,^
The military question, alone, rem;4ined between Bavaria and
union with the North German Confederation. Pranck , the Bavarian
war minister, asked for full military independence in time of
peace and the establishment and administration of the military
budget by the Bavarian Landtag. In return Bavaria would acknowl-
edge the subordination of the army to the king of Prussia in war
time, would permit the entire reorganization of the army after the
Prussian rodel, and would to the "Prussian king the right of in-
spection in time of peace. ^6
<ui agreement was reached between Bavaria and Bismarck, November
IPth, but the king and the Prussian officers were not satisfied.
Since Bismarck knew well the value of the opportunity that was
within his grasp, he at once busied himself in bringing pressure
to bear upon the opponents of the treaty. He threatened to make
public the names of the men who were blocking the negotiations, he
quarrelled with the Crown Prince of Prussia, he drew the Grand
T)uke of Baden and the Duke of Oldenburg to his support, although
they agreed with the king, and he warned King William, of the dan-
85.Brandenburg, Der Kintritt ,69-72.
Stolze ,sup.cit. ,24° 3t se>i.
36. " 253; Brandenburg, "Der Eintritt,73.
Howard , German Empire ,393.
This was the last of the military conventions which were
negotiated between Prussia and the South German States. The
other states, Wdrtemberg, Baden, and South Hesse had concluded
their conventions in 1867, but Bavaria had waited until thepresent tire.

ger of opposing such a trivial natter as that the uniforms of the
Bavarian soldiers should retain the Bavarian collar. Bavaria
yielded the matter of the military budget to the Reichstag, and
permitted her troops to take the oath in tine of war.??
The negotiations as they were carried on between the I9th and
23rd cf November are not known, but on the latter date the king of
"Prussia gave his consent to the treaty and on the same evening it
was signed. Rp
The contents of the treaty between Bavaria and the North Herman
Confederation have been indicated already. The most inportant pro-
visions that have not been mentioned were: Bavaria should have .six:
votes in the Bundesrat as before, control of railways, post and
telegraph systers, have a permanent position on the committee on
military affairs, and have the presidency of the comr ittee on for-
eign affairs. ^9 The power to declare war was vested in the Federal
Council.
87. Brandenburg, Per Bintritt , 73-74; Stolze , sup. cit. ,256,
88. Briefe und Aktenstucke , II ,Nr . 178.
B9. " Nr. 188.
Note- Howard in The German Empire ,26 ,295 ,296 ,333 ,390
,
gives
the special rights granted to Bavaria. Bavaria retained certain
regulations concerning the right of domicile and cf settlement;
this was true of the postal and telegraph systens ,alsc; the tax-
ation of domestic brandy and beer was made a matter for state
legislation; certain railroad exemptions were granted; certain
insurance laws may be passed only with the permission of Bavaria
Bavaria retained the legislation and regulations respecting mil-
itary matters which were in force at the time of her entrance in
to the Empire. The general obligation to do military service
rests on the Bavarian citizen as well as other Germans. All Im-
perial legislation in regard to the army extends to Bavaria as
to the other states .Bavaria assumes the sole burden of her own
rrilitary organization and has complete control of the army in
time of peace. Bavaria has six vote3 in the Bundesrat, has a
permanent place on the Imperial Committee for the Army and Fort-
ifications in the Bundesrat, has the chairmanship of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, and has the right of substitution in the
chairmanship of the Bundesrat. Should the Imperial ambassador be
prevented from acting, the Bavarian ambassador may represent him
The expenses of the Federal Office for citizenship are not
shared by Bavaria; 75$ of the expenses of the railroad office

In the reantime the treaties with Baden and Hes3e had been
signed, ^hat with Wfirtemberg was concluded on the 25th of November,
Bismarck had not expected Bavaria to yield so quickly, although
he believed that finally an agreement would be reached. 90 How he
felt in regard to the conclusion of the negotiations is related by
Busch: "The Chief was in the salon with the three Bavarian Pleni-
potentiaries. Tn about a quarter c** an hour he opened one 3ide of
the door, bent his head forward with his friendliest look, and came
in with a glass in his hand and took a seat at the tabic. 'Well,'
he said,his voice and looks betraying his emotions, 'the Bavarian
treaty is made and signed. German unity is secure and the German
Emperor , too. ' We were all silent for a moment. he observed ,' the
newspapers will not be satisfied, and he who writes history in the
usual way may criticize our agreement. He may possibly say, "The
stupid fellow should have asked for more; he would have got it, as
they would have been compelled to 2'ield." And he may be right so
far as the compelled, is concerned. But what I attached more impor-
tance to was they should be thoroughly pleased with the thing. What
are treaties when people are compelled to enter into them.' And I
know they went away pleased . I did not want to squeeze them or
to make capital out of the situation. The treaty has its deficien-
cies, but is for that the more durable. The future can supply th33c
deficiencies
.
The king, also, was not satisfied. He was of the
opinion that such a treaty was not worth much. Vy opinion is quite
different. I consider it one of the most important results which »e
have attained in recent years. T finally succeeded in carrying it
90,Busch,Bismarck:Some Secret "Pages of his History , I
,
946
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Note continued-
is exempt to Bavaria, as is all taxation to pay expenses of reg-
ulating taxes on beers and brandies. Bavaria dees net contribute
to that part of the Imperial debt which concerns military rat-
ters and the post and telegraph sys tecs.Where Bavaria has an
ambassador she does not support the Imperial Ambassador.
f tifi.W I
39.
through "by exciting apprehensions of English intervention unless
the matter were speedily settled. As to the question of the Emperor,
I made that proposal palatable to then in the course of the negoti-
ations by representing that it mist he easier and mere satisfactory
for their sovereign to concede certain rights to the Hen-ran Emperor
than to the neighboring king of Prussia. 1 "? 1
Bismarck wanted "Bavaria to enter willingly and at peac j , and he
was ready to grant scrre special rights in order to bring this about.
This was his whole policy in a nutshell, and it seens to have been
his policy since 1866,
There was some discussion ever the foru of the title that William
should bear. The Crown Prince wanted the Kings of the South German
States reduced to dukes, and his father made king of Germany. Bis-
marck wanted the title Emperor of Gerrany, hut Bavaria objected to
this so decidedly that Bismarck conceded the point, and the title
wa3 given as German Emperor.-
It was not to be expected that the treaties would be approved
by the different states without opposition. In Bavaria the king
was disappointed because he had not secured an increase of terri-
tory. It is possible that he thought of resigning in favor of his
brother. Row his consent was finally secured is not known. The
anti-Prussian forces also busied themselves in opposition, but in
spite of this the treaty was approved in January , IP?I. In Prussia
it was thought that Bavaria had been given too much. Pelbruck told
the North German Parliament that it was natural that a large state
like Bavaria should be granted special rights. He said that "the
primary requisite of unity," a united German army had been secured
and with that they should be satisfied. Here, too, the treaty wa3
soon approved.
91. "nu3ch,Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History , 1 , 841,
"
9?
.
Kobell ,sup.cit. ,41.
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While the question of the adoption of the treaties in the dif-
ferent states was being debated Bismarck was bending his efforts
to secure for "Prussia the titular, as well as the real, leadership
of Germany. The present movement was not a revolt against the mon-
archical principal as was that of 1^48-49, nor was it unitarian
in the sense that it sought to create a great, powerful 3tate by
destroying the single states. ^3 it was rather a ©overrent toward a
close confederation of the states of Germany leaving each to re-
tain a3 much as possible of its independence and its sovereignty.
It was for this reason that Bismarck preferred to have the princes
make the offer of the Imperial crown to ^miam rather than to
have the Peichstag nake it. That the Herman people could dispose
of the crown he considered disproved by the events of 1 849. Of all
the Herman princes Brismarck strongly favored King Ludwig of Bava-
ria as the most suitable to nake the proffer of the crown. °4 it
seers very probable that Bray and Bismarck had mentioned the Kjiiser
frage late in October, but it is not known which broached the sub-
ject.*"- Bray seems to have favored granting the crown to William
even when he thought of Bavaria's remaining outside of the Confed-
eration. Delbrtick brought back from Munich in Septerrber the impres-
sion that a German Kaiser would be popular.
Ludwig thought that if Bavaria were to nake the offer, it should
be the concern of the court and not of the ninistry. Therefore,
most of the negotiations on that subject were carried on by Chief
Equerry , Count Holstein, without the aid, and often without the
knowledge of Prime Minister Bray. About the time of the signing of
the treaty, November 85, Ludwig sent Holstein to Versailles with
special personal orders. It is pretty well established that his
93.Stolze ,sup.cit. ,164.
P4.Kobell ,sup.cit. ,25.
P^.Stolze ,sup.eit. ,199-800,
It Tttf
object was to learn the manner in which Bismarck wished the offer
made; that Hols te in brought back with hir to Hohenschwangau , where
Ludwig was staying, the draft of the K^iaorhi^lefQ,; and that after
"King ludwig had agreed to its form the Chief Equerry, journeying
07
by rapid stages, laid it before King William on December 3.
The final act of union and the proclamation of the Empire took
place in the great Hall of Mirrors of the palace of Versailles,
January IR, I87I,
It has been shewn that Biamarck did not interfere in any way
in bavarian affairs, nor did he offer any inducer ent to any cf the
South Horn an States to enter the North Gen an Confederation In the
period fror 1*66 tc IP70. For hir it was enough to know that he
had a treaty of offense and defense with Bavaria, a link of some
strength which if it did not lead to union at last, would leave his
hands free to weld the North Gen an Confederation into a compact,,
effective government, While he was engaged in this ta3k he observe
the effect of such events as the Luxembourg affair upon South Ger-
many , how closely the Zcllverein bound the sections, and the in-
fluence of such Nationalists as TTohenlohe.
4s soon as the Franco-Prussian war seemed upon the point of corn-
eluding favorably for Germany, however, he began to direct his ef-
forts toward securing German unity. He seldom openly declared that
as his object, but every opportunity was used to bring it about.
When one thinks of the domineering character which is ascribed
to the man, he is rather surprised to observe how gently and at
the same time how deftly he treated with Bavaria. He ser.t Delbruck
97.Brandenburg, "Briefe und /Vktenstucke , II ,Nrs. P08 ,209 ,?,I4
,
833,
Hohenlohe .Memoirs ,11 ,34;Busch ,3up. cit. I ,393.
Schu 1 thesa ,Ceschich tsk al endar , I R 7 , 2 8 I
.

to Munich at "Bavaria' 3 own request to confer on the n.atter of un-
ion. Here Mittnacht, as well as Delbruck, showed Bavaria the in-
tenabiljty of her position. When Bavaria accepted his invitaticn
to continue the conference at Versailles, Bi3rrarck secured a groat
advantage. He now knew hew anxious Bavaria was for union. The Ba-
varian ministers were surrounded by those of other South German
States busily engaged in concluding treaties with the North Ger-
man Confederation through Bismarck's colleagues, Delbruck, and
Foon.
With the leaders of North Germany Bismarck was domineering and
arbitrary. He differed with King William, with the Crown Prince,
and with von Moltke,but he carried them with him at the last. He
seems to have been the only impartial participant in the negotia-
tions. He, alone, could have carried them through successfully.
The German nation stands as a monument to his genius.
•r
Appendix ^.
Kaiserbriefe of King Ludwig to King William.
Die von "Preuaaena HeldenkCnige aiegreich geftihrten deutachen
Stamme, in Sprache und Sitte, Wissensohaft und TTunst seit Jahr-
hunderten vereint, feiern nunmehr aueh eine Waffenbrtiderschaft
,
welche von der Hachtatellung eines geeinigten Peutschlanda glanz-
endes Zeugniss gibt, Beseelt von dem Streben, an dieaer werdenden
Eir.igung Deutschland3 nach Kraften r itzuwirken , habe ich nicht ge-
aaumt ,deaahalb ml t. dem Bundeakanzleran.te dea norddeutachen Bundes
in Verhandlungen zu treten. Dieselben aind jtingst in Veraaillea
zum Abschluaae gediehen. Nach dec, Beitritte SMdeut3chlanda zun
deutachen Verfaaaungabundniaae warden die Sr. Vaj . dem TCCnige von
Preu8aen tlbertragenen Prasidialrechte fiber alle deutachen Staaten
aich erstrecken. Ich habe mich zu deren Vereinigung in Einer Hand
in der Heberzeugung bereit erklart daa dadurch den Oesammtinter-
eaaen dea deutachen Vaterlandea und aeiner verbtlndeten PQrsten ent-
aprochen werde, zugleich aber in dem Vertrauen, daa8 die dem Bundea-
praaidiur nach der Verfaaaung zuatehenden Pechte durch Wiederher-
8tellung einea deutachen Peichea und der deutachen Kaiser wttrde als
Pechte bezeichnet werden, welche Se. Majeatat der KCnig von Preua*-
aen im naren dea geaarrmten deutachen Vaterland8 auf Orund der Eini-
gung aeiner Fftrsteri auaf5bt. In Wurdigung der ^ichtigkeit dieaer
Sache wende ich rieh nun an Eure k Bait den Vorachlage in Oereir.-
achaft rrit rr.ir bei Sr. Maj
. dem KOnige von Preuaaen in Auregung zu
bringen, da33 die Auaflbung der Bundeapraaidialrechte rr.it Ptihrung
dea Titela einea deutachen Kaiaera verbunden werde. Ea iat rr.ir eine
erhebender Hedanke , daa8 ich mich durch meine Stellung in Deutach-
land und durch die Oeachichte meinea Landea berufen ftthlen kann
,
zur KrOnung dea deutachen Einigung8wcrkea den eraten Schritt zu

TT
thun,und gebe ich mich der freudigen Roffnung hin, daaa TSure k-
rrieineir. Vorgehen Ihre freundlic;he Zustiirnnung ertheilen werden.
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Appendix B.
Biarrarck'a Attitude tov/ard the Entrance of Bavaria into the
North German Confederation.
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